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We provide a comprehensive view of widening income inequality in the United States contrasting
conditions since 1980 with those in earlier postwar years. We argue that the income distribution in
each period was strongly shaped by a set of economic institutions.  The early postwar years were dominated
by unions, a negotiating framework set in the Treaty of Detroit, progressive taxes, and a high minimum
wage -- all parts of a general government effort to broadly distribute the gains from growth. More
recent years have been characterized by reversals in all these dimensions in an institutional pattern
known as the Washington Consensus.  Other explanations for income disparities including skill-biased
technical change and international trade are seen as factors operating within this broader institutional
story.
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Inequality and Institutions in 20
th Century America 
 “A rising tide lifts all the boats” 
                                 
                                       John F. Kennedy,  
                                       October 15, 1960 
 
“Simultaneous and identical actions of United States Steel and other leading steel 
corporations, increasing steel prices by some 6 dollars a ton, constitute a wholly 
unjustifiable and irresponsible defiance of the public interest.” 
                                                                               
                                                                                     John F. Kennedy 
                                                                                     April 11, 1962 
I. Introduction 
  A central feature of post-World War II America was mass upward mobility: individuals 
seeing sharply rising incomes through much of their careers and each generation living better than 
the last. The engine of that mobility – John Kennedy’s rising tide – was increased labor 
productivity. 
It therefore is problematic that recent productivity gains have not significantly raised 
incomes for most American workers.
2   In the quarter century between 1980 and 2005, non-farm 
business productivity increased by 67.4 percent. Over the same quarter century, median weekly 
earnings of full-time workers rose from $613 to $705, a gain of only 14 percent (figures in $2005 
dollars
3). Median weekly compensation - earnings plus estimated fringe benefits - rose from $736 
to $876, a gain of 19 percent. Detailed analysis of these years shows that college educated women 
are the only large labor force group for whom median compensation grew in line with labor 
productivity (Section II). 
 
                                              
2 See  for example, Dew-Becker and Gordon (2005), Krugman (2006), Pearlstein ( 2006, a, b), and Tritch (2006), 
3 To compare earnings and productivity on a consistent basis, earnings and compensation are adjusted using the GDP 
deflator.    3
Since productivity growth expands total income, slow income growth for the average 
worker implies faster income growth elsewhere in the distribution. In the U.S. case, growth 
occurred at the very top.
4 Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez estimate that the share of gross 
personal income claimed by top 1 percent of tax filing units – about 1.4 million returns – rose 
from 8.2 percent in 1980 to 17.4 percent in 2005. Among tax returns that report positive wage and 
salary income, the share of wages and salaries claimed by top 1 percent rose from 6.4 percent in 
1980 to 11.6 percent in 2005.
5  
 To place these developments in historical perspective, we construct the following ratio:   
     (1)             Median Annual Compensation for Full-Time WorkersT 
             Annualized Value of Output per Hour in the Non-Farm Business SectorT  
 
           The numerator of (1) is the sum of median annual earnings of full-time workers and the 
value of estimated fringe benefits. The denominator of (1) is Non-Farm Business Productivity – 
the standard labor productivity measure - expressed as an annual dollar amount.
6 We can think of 
(1) as a bargaining power index (BPI), the share of total output per worker that the average full-
time worker captures in compensation. 
Figure (1) displays this Bargaining Power Index for the last from 1950-2005.
7  For 
purposes of comparison, Figure (1) also displays the Piketty-Saez estimate of the 99.5th income 
                                              
4 Slow income growth for the average worker can also mean faster growth of capital income. We return to this point 
in the Appendix. 
5 See Piketty and Saez (2003) and the updating of their figures to 2005 on Emmanuel Saez’ website 
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/ (URL). Their calculations are based on pre-tax market income (wages, partnership 
income, interest, dividends, rents, etc.) excluding transfer payments. A tax filing unit is represents a tax return (which 
may be single or joint).Piketty and Saez estimate the total number of tax filing units that would occur if all U.S. 
households filed federal income taxes and figures like the “top 1 percent of tax filing units” refer to the top 1 percent 
of that estimated number rather than the top 1 percent of those who actually file..  
6 Calculation of this ratio is detailed in the Appendix.  
7 Data come from authors ’ tabulations of the 1950 and 1960 Decennial Census and Current Population Survey micro 
data sets for 1961 and 1963 onward. Data is missing for 1951-59 because Current Population Survey data do not exist 
in machine readable form for these years and published summaries of the data do not report full time workers 
separately.     4
percentile on federal tax returns
8 – the median income of the top 1 percent of reported incomes – 
adjusted for fringe benefits and also normalized by Non-Farm Business Productivity.  
Figure 1
Bargaining Power Indices for the Median Full-Time Worker 
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Piketty Saez 95 1/2% income adjusted for
Fringe Benefits and Normalized by
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     Figure 1 summarizes fifty-five years of economic history. In the “Golden Age” of 1947-73, 
labor productivity and median family income each roughly doubled. The Golden Age is 
illustrated in Figure 1 by the relatively steady BPI - median compensation of full-time workers 
(the numerator) and labor productivity (the denominator) growing at the same rate from 1950 to 
the late 1970s. Simultaneously, income equality increased as very high incomes (illustrated by the 
99.5th percentile) grew more slowly than labor productivity.   
      In the 1970s stagflation, median compensation of full-time workers began to lag behind 
productivity growth, a trend that accelerated after 1980. In Figure 1, the lag is illustrated by the 
BPI declining from .6 in 1980 to .53 in 1990 and to .43 in 2005. This declining bargaining power 
                                              
8 This income measure excludes capital gains.   
   5
of the average full-time worker is a useful way to describe why significant productivity growth 
since 1980 has translated into weak growth in earnings and compensation.  
     Very high incomes also lagged productivity growth through the 1970s and early 1980s. But 
beginning in 1986, very high incomes began to increase rapidly and have outstripped productivity 
growth through the present. In the Piketty-Saez data, the richest 1 percent of tax filers claimed 80 
percent of all income gains reported in federal tax returns between 1980 and 2005.
9  
Many economists attribute the average worker’s declining bargaining power to skill-biased 
technical change: technology, augmented by globalization, which heavily favors better educated 
workers. In this explanation, the broad distribution of productivity gains during the Golden Age is 
often assumed to be a free market outcome that can be restored by creating a more educated 
workforce.  
We argue instead that the Golden Age relied on market outcomes strongly moderated by 
institutional factors. Following the literature on economic growth that emphasizes the role of 
institutions in economic outcomes, we argue that institutions and norms affect the distribution of 
economic rewards as well as their aggregate size. Our argument leads to an explanation of 
earnings levels and inequality in which skill-biased technical change, globalization and related 
factors function within an institutional framework. In our interpretation, the recent impacts of 
technology and trade have been amplified by the collapse of these institutions, a collapse which 
arose because economic forces led to a shift in the political environment over the 1970s and 
1980s. If our interpretation is correct, no rebalancing of the labor force can restore a more equal 
distribution of productivity gains without government intervention and changes in private sector 
behavior.   
                                              
9 Details of this calculation are contained in the Appendix.   6
We do not challenge the existence of technology’s and trade’s effects on labor demand 
(e.g. Card and DiNardo, 2002). Rather, we argue that technology and trade’s impacts are 
embedded in a larger institutional story - a story hinted at by the second John Kennedy quote that 
began this paper.  Previous writing has examined relationships between inequality and measurable 
institutional variables including the rate of unionization, the minimum wage, and tax policy (e.g. 
Autor, Katz and Kearny, 2005; Bound and Johnson, 1992; DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux, 1996; 
Feenberg and Poterba, 1993; Gordon and Slemrod 1998; Lee 1999; Reynolds 2007; Saez 2004). 
Other authors have focused on historical narrative (e.g. Katz and Lipsky, 1998; Osterman, 1999). 
In this paper, we combine data and history in a way that permits telling a more complete story 
including the likely origins of institutional shifts. By emphasizing the interplay among 
productivity, inequality, and the earnings growth of average workers we are also better able to 
describe the impact of current trends on economic life. We call the post-World War II institutional 
arrangements the Treaty of Detroit, after the most famous labor–management agreement of that 
period.  This agreement was replaced in the 1980s and surrounding years by another set of 
institutional arrangements we call the Washington Consensus.
10  As we will describe, the 
decisions to strengthen or to abandon these institutions were made by many people in complex 
economic and political settings.  
We develop this argument in the sections that follow.  Section II describes the evolving 
nature of labor demand and presents the data that frame our argument. Section III describes the 
institutional arrangements that originated in the Great Depression and helped to distribute 
productivity gains broadly from 1947 to 1973. Section IV describes the way in which the post-
1973 productivity slowdown and associated stagflation ultimately led to the arrangements’ 
                                              
10 This term normally is used for LDCs, but the spirit of this concept applies well to the changing institutions within 
the United States.  We use the term here to refer to the microeconomic policies of deregulation and privatization of 
the consensus, not the macroeconomic policies of fiscal discipline and stable exchange rates.  See John Williamson, 
“What Washington Means by Policy Reform,” in John Williamson (ed.), Latin American Adjustment: How Much has 
Happened? (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1990), pp. 7-24.   7
collapse, to be replaced by institutions that made the labor market particularly vulnerable to 
extreme effects of technical change and trade – a vulnerability that is not as evident in most other 
industrialized countries. Our description focuses more on the earlier institutions than the later 
ones as they are less familiar.  Section V concludes by considering the implications of our story 
for policy.  
 
II. The Evolving Nature of Labor Demand   
For over a decade, the economist’s primary explanation for income inequality has been 
skill-biased technical change.
11  While the explanation has been refined over time 
12 its core is 
unchanged. Technology, perhaps augmented by international trade, is shifting demand toward 
more skilled workers faster than labor supply can adjust. This explanation of earnings inequality 
has resonated strongly with the public as well as government policy.  Educational improvement 
has been a central policy focus at all levels of government. Equally important, many government 
officials describe educational differences as the central driver of inequality, as in the August 1, 
2006 remarks of Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson:  
   …. we must also recognize that, as our economy grows, market forces work to provide 
the greatest rewards to those with the needed skills in the growth areas. This means that 
those workers with less education and fewer skills will realize fewer rewards and have 
fewer opportunities to advance. In 2004, workers with a bachelor's degree earned almost 
$23,000 more per year, on average, than workers with a high school degree only. This gap 
has grown more than 60 percent since 1975.
13 
 
                                              
11 See Levy and Murnane (1992) for a history of how earnings inequality became a prominent issue in labor 
economics.  
12 In one refinement, technology is now assumed to substitute for mid-skilled workers rather than the lowest skilled 
workers (Autor, Levy and Murnane 2003, Autor Katz and Kearny, 2006).  In a second refinement, the steady growth 
of earnings inequality among observationally similar workers in the Current Population Survey was first described as 
measuring returns to unobserved dimensions of skill (Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993). It is now identified with 
increasing year-to-year earnings volatility (Gottschalk and Moffitt, 1994) or as an artifact of particular data sets 
(Lemieux, 2006) 
13 http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/hp41.htm. The remarks were delivered at Columbia University.   8
As in Paulson’s remarks, most discussion of these forces is framed in levels of formal 
schooling – e.g. college versus high school. But the theory of skill-related demand applies equally 
well to differences among workers with the same quantity of formal schooling.  
Figure 2 displays one such difference based on the salaries of new associates in Wall 
Street law firms. In standard labor market data, these new lawyers would be classified as men, 
ages 25-34, with post-bachelors education (until fairly recently, women female associates were 
rare in Wall Street firms). In 1967, a new associate at Cravath, Swain and Moore earned about 
$49,500 in 2005 dollars (Galanter and Palay, 1991, p. 24). This salary, which excludes fringe 
benefits and bonuses, was 14 percent higher than median earnings of all full-time male workers, 
ages 25-34, with post-bachelors education.  
Figure 2 
 Median Earnings of All 25-34 Year old Men with Graduate Education and Starting Associate 
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Approximate Starting Salary of New Associates
in Marjor NY Law Firms - e.g.Cravath, Swain
and Mooore (excludes bonuses and fringes)
 
In 2005, a starting associate at Cravath earned about $135,000, excluding bonuses and 
fringes. The gap between this salary and the median salary of 25-34 year old mean with post-  9
bachelors education had opened from 14 percent to 120 percent. The salaries of Wall Street 
lawyers, from associate to partner are often described as winner-take-all salaries - an extreme 
form of skill-based inequality and, in fact, Alfred Marshall (1947) used lawyers as an example 
when he first described winner-take-all markets in 1890s England.
14  The question is why such 
salaries were far less common in 1950s and 1960s America.  
Consider next workers whose education stopped with a bachelor’s degree – hereafter, 
BA’s. The common understanding of skill-biased technical change suggests demand for such 
workers should be increasing. But as more people attend college (and more college graduates go 
to graduate school), it is plausible that today’s median BA is “less skilled” than the BA of 10 or 
20 years ago. Given these opposing forces, it is reasonable to ask whether the compensation of the 
“median” BA has kept pace with the growth of labor productivity. 
Answering this question requires two refinements. First, even if economy-wide 
productivity is constant, an individual’s compensation typically increases with age and 
experience
15 and the age of the “median” BA has increased over time. To avoid the spurious 
effect of age on compensation, we divide BA’s by age (and, for similar reasons, by gender). 
Second, the standard measure of Non-Farm Business Productivity also includes potentially 
spurious age and education effects. Since 1950, the labor force has become more educated and 
experienced and this changing workforce composition has increased productivity growth above 
what it otherwise would have been. If “compensation-growing-faster-than-productivity” is to have 
                                              
14 A winner-take-all market is one where the highest ranked participants get rewards far larger than those ranked 
even slightly lower. Such markets often arise in the provision of a complex high stakes service that must be done 
right the first time – a legal defense, a delicate surgery, a financial merger – where small differences in skills that 
cannot be taught can have big consequences.  The pay of virtually all partners in Wall Street law firms fall into the 
top 1 percent of reported incomes on tax returns  which began in 2005 at $310,000 (the figure excludes capital gains). 
15 In an economy without productivity growth, the typical worker still earns more at age 35 than at age 25 but he 
earns no more than a 35 year-old worker had earned twenty or thirty years earlier. When a worker benefits from 
experience premiums and economy-wide productivity growth, individual wage gains are larger and each generation 
earns more than previous generations.     10
a consistent meaning over time, it is necessary to remove labor force composition effects from the 
annual rate of productivity growth, a straightforward procedure.
16  
Figure 3 displays the BPI for six groups of workers: male and female BA’s, ages 25-34, 
35-44 and 45-54. In each case, calculations are similar to Equation 1 except that the numerator is 
now based on median compensation of a particular group of full-time workers – e.g. 35-44 year-
old female BA’s – and Non-farm Business Productivity in the denominator has been adjusted for 
labor force composition effects.
17 Figure 4 displays similar information for men and women 
whose education stopped at High School.
18 
                                              
16 We thank Larry Katz for this point. Labor composition effects on productivity were taken from "Changes in the 
Composition of Labor for BLS Multifactor Productivity Measures, 2005” Bureau of Labor Statistics, March 23, 2007  
http://www.bls.gov/mfp/mprlabor.pdf, Table 3. We thank Dan Sichel for guidance on using these data. 
 
17 Calculations are detailed in the Appendix 




   11
Figure 3
Bargaining Power Indices for Male and Female BA's,



















Bargaining Power Indices for Male and Female HS Graduates,
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The central feature of Figures 3 and 4 is the difference in men’s and women’s patterns. 
For all groups of men – both BA’s and high school graduates - the median worker’s compensation 
grows roughly in line with productivity until some date between 1970 and 1980. After that date 
(which varies by group) the median worker’s compensation lags increasingly behind productivity 
growth.
19   For all groups of women, the median worker’s compensation tracks productivity 
growth more closely through the entire 55 years. In our terms, the post-1980 partial convergence 
of men’s and women’s compensation arose because the average woman’s compensation claimed a 
roughly constant share of output per worker while the average man’s compensation claimed a 
declining share.
20 
A closer look at the data for men shows that median compensation begins to lag 
productivity first among BA’s and then among high school graduates. Among male BA’s, the first 
declines in the BPI appear in early 1970s among 25-34 year olds – the baby-boom cohorts going 
to college (Freeman, 1976). In subsequent years, declines appear in older age ranges as the young 
cohorts age.  By contrast, the compensation of all three age groups of male high school graduates 
begins to sharply lag productivity around  1980, suggesting a structural shift, a point to which we 
will return.  
A closer look at the data for women shows that the BPI’s of women high school graduates 
declines steadily, though at a much slower rate than the corresponding BPI’s for men. Female 
BA’s are the only group in Figures 3 and 4 whose median compensation consistently grows in 
line with economy-wide productivity – i.e. whose bargaining power has not declined. 
                                              
19 A caveat to this description is the absence of data CPS data on full time workers from 1951-1959. Other data – e.g. 
the way in which median family income tracked productivity growth over this decade – suggests that individual 
compensation must have traced productivity growth as well.   
20 It is beyond this paper’s scope to examine why women’s compensation tracked productivity better than men’s, but 
possible factors include women’s increased work experience and the decline in occupational segregation.    13
 To put these figures in perspective, consider a standard analysis of earnings inequality 
that focuses on the relative earnings of college and high school graduates: 
  
  (2)                  Median Earnings of 35-44 Yr.-Old Male BA’s   
           Median Earnings of 35-44 Yr.-Old Male High School Graduates. 
                        
This ratio (2) is exactly equivalent to the ratio of the corresponding BPI’s in Figures 3 and 4: 
                 
               (3)                         BPI for 35-44 Yr.-Old Male BA’s  
                                     BPI for 35-44 Yr.-Old Male HS Graduates
21 
This ratio (3) is separately graphed for men and women in Figure 5 where it tells the familiar 
education/earnings inequality story – the ratio of college-to-high school earnings narrows in the 
1970s and then increases substantially through the late 1990s before closing slightly in recent 
years. 
                                              
21  The ratios (2) and (3) are equivalent because, as detailed in the Appendix, we construct BPI’s by multiplying both 
college and high school incomes by the same fringe benefit adjustment and dividing the resulting compensation by 
the same economy-wide average productivity figure.    14
Figure 5
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When Figures 5 and 3 are taken together they show that the college-high school premium 
is only one part of the technology-trade/skill story. The story’s second part asks whether 
technology and trade still permit the compensation of the average college graduate to grow in line 
with productivity – i.e. is the average bachelor’s degree still sufficient to catch the rising tide?  In 
the case of men, at least, the answer is no. More generally, something over three-quarters of the 
labor force currently face insufficient demand to keep compensation growing in line with 
economy-wide productivity.  
We argue that while the relatively weak demand for BA’s is fairly recent, it represents an 
old phenomenon: the periodic inability of the free market to broadly distribute the gains from 
productivity. In particular, the potential for this problem existed in the Golden Age but the 
problem was largely overcome by economic institutions and norms. The composition of the labor   15
force was, of course, much different then. In 1940, only five percent of the labor force had a 
bachelor’s degree.   Unemployment in the Depression had been concentrated among the less 
educated and less skilled members of the labor force, and it was largely for these workers that the 
New Deal erected a new structure of institutions and norms (US Bureau of the Census, 1975, 380; 
Margo, 1991). 
This result was a decline in income inequality that was reinforced by the controls of World 
War II and produced a broad distribution of productivity gains for at least another quarter 
century   As  Piketty and Saez (2003) write:.  
    The compression of wages during the war can be explained by the wage controls of the 
war economy, but how can we explain the fact that high wage earners did not recover after 
the wage controls were removed? This evidence cannot be immediately reconciled with 
explanations of the reduction of inequality based solely on technical change as in the 
famous Kuznets process. We think that this pattern or evolution of inequality is additional 
indirect evidence that nonmarket mechanisms such as labor market institutions and social 
norms regarding inequality may play a role in setting compensation at the top. (pp. 33-34)  
 
We agree and in the sections that follow, we show how these non-market mechanisms 
distributed productivity gains broadly while limiting the extent of  very high incomes —at least 
until the mechanisms broke down.   
 
III. Norms, Institutions and the Golden Age.  
The non-market mechanisms that shaped the postwar Golden Age had roots in the Great 
Depression and the New Deal. At first glance, it is surprising that norms and institutions – 
microeconomic policies – grew out of a macroeconomic crisis. But macroeconomic policy as we 
now understand it did not exist in the Great Depression—Keynes’  General Theory was not 
published until 1936. 
In 1933, Roosevelt’s first year in office, unemployment stood at nearly 25% and 
microeconomic policies were apparently the only tools at hand.  Lacking a theory of aggregate   16
demand, Roosevelt’s New Deal policies revolved around something closer to “individual 
demand”—a theory that if policy could raise wages and prices to reasonable levels, workers and 
producers would earn enough money to stimulate the economy.  
This theory was implicit in the first major piece of New Deal legislation, the 1933 
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) that gave the government control over employer 
contracts, and encouraged labor and industry to negotiate wages, work hours, and other 
employment issues (Atleson, 1998).  The resulting contracts shortened work hours, increased 
wages significantly, and raised prices. With the support of the Roosevelt administration, unions 
and collective bargaining began to flourish as employers were hampered in attempts to obstruct 
organizational efforts (Temin, 2000).  Applying the same logic, NIRA also created the nation’s 
first minimum wage set at $.25 cents per hour.  
  The Supreme Court outlawed the NIRA in 1935, citing it as an overreach of federal power 
into state interests.  Congress responded quickly passing the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA)—the “Wagner Act”—in the same year, endorsing the rights of labor and limiting the 
means employers could use to combat unions, while reestablishing the $.25 minimum wage. 
While unions grew dramatically under the NLRA, the post-war system of collective bargaining 
may have had its origins more in the unemployment of the Depression than in Roosevelt’s 
reaction to that unemployment (Freeman 1998).  Economic conditions demanded that something 
be done, and unions enjoyed strong public support.
22   
The NLRA’s minimum wage, like its support of unions and collective bargaining was set 
to raise wages significantly. As with our Bargaining Power Index (equation 1) we can put the first 
minimum wage - $.25/hour – in perspective by comparing it to average output per worker in the 
economy:       
                                              
22 In 1936, 76 percent of respondents to a Gallup Poll question said they were in favor of labor unions. Result 
reported as Roper Center Accession Number 0174236.   17
           (4)                      Annual Earnings at the Minimum WageT 
               Annualized Value of Output per Hour in the Non-Farm Business SectorT  
 
In 1938, annual earnings at the first minimum wage represented 27 percent of the economy’s 
average output per worker. Between 1947 and 2005, the value of the minimum wage would 
exceed that percentage in only four other years (Figure 6) and stands at something less than half 
that percentage today.  
 
      New Deal policy also raised taxes on very high incomes. On the eve of Roosevelt’s election, 
Hoover raised the top bracket rate sharply from 25% to 63% in order to reduce the federal deficit 
under the impression that the Depression was over. In 1936, after the economy began to recover 
more robustly, Roosevelt raised the top bracket rate further to 79% (Figure 7).  This additional 
increment was part of a general tax rise that included a tax on undistributed profits, based on the 
Figure  6
                       Ratio of Annual Earnings at the Minimum Wage to 









1930  1940  1950  1960 1970 1980 1990  2000  2010  18
presumption that the economy had progressed into a normal recovery—a presumption speedily 
abandoned in the recession that followed hard on the heels of the higher taxes (Rosen, 2005). 
Nonetheless, Roosevelt’s clear goal was to compress the income distribution using unions and the 
minimum wage to raise low incomes while using tax rates and moral suasion to hold down 
incomes at the top.  
        
          While New Deal policies were strongly pro-organized labor, the policies could not provide 
the outcome labor wanted most – an economy growing rapidly enough to bring back full 
employment. In 1937, five years into the New Deal, the unemployment rate had fallen only to 
14.3 percent. Labor-business relations remained contentious and were marked by continued 
Figure 7
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frequent strikes. When the economy reentered recession in 1938, part of the public blamed 
unions, and public support for unions weakened moderately.
23  
When the United States entered World War II, mobilization and production became the 
focus of the economy.  The war induced a labor shortage, ending Great Depression 
unemployment, and the principles of efficient manufacturing became ingrained into America’s 
economic philosophy.  Stability became the government’s goal and bargaining solidity was 
critical to achieving uninterrupted production.  
  Although policies of arbitration and dispute resolution through administrative means 
demonstrated the principles of uninterrupted production, workers feared being left out of wartime 
prosperity and threats of labor action remained high. AFL-CIO action from 1939 to 1941 and 
wildcat strikes during 1943 and 1944 interrupted wartime production and impacted munitions 
production.  Actual wartime strikes were brief and uncommon, but they damaged the public 
perception of unions.
24  The military saw unions as detrimental to the war effort, and they took 
several initiatives to undercut union power (Koistinen, 2004). 
  The government created the National Defense Mediation Board in 1941 to settle labor 
disputes and replaced it a year later with the National War Labor Board (NWLB).  These 
initiatives achieved no-strike and no-lockout pledges from unions and companies and effectively 
froze wages for the duration of the war.  The agreement created an uneasy peace, but it was a 
source of tension between unions, the government, and industry throughout the war. 
                                              
23 In 1938, 58 percent of respondents to a Gallup Poll question said they were in favor of labor unions, down from 76 
percent in 1936 and 1937. Result reported as Roper Center Accession Number 0274556. The 1938 result is not 
strictly comparable to earlier years because the 1938 question permitted a response of No Opinion (14 percent) while 
earlier years did not.   
 
24 In 1942, the National Opinion Research Center asked: “After the war, do you think the Federal government should 
regulate...labor unions more or less than it did before the war started (say 1938)?” More = 60 percent, Same = 13 
percent, Less = 6 percent, Depends or Don’t Know = 15 percent. Roper Center Accession Number 0362578. 
   20
  The Revenue Act of 1942 taxed significant wartime earnings, but the government did not 
include workers’ pensions and health insurance as profits, providing employers with an incentive 
to avoid the tax by supplementing labor benefits.  The NWLB also decided that employer 
contributions to benefit plans should not be included as wages, further assisting labor.  Industry 
reluctantly supported these benefits, mostly as an attempt to discourage union membership, and 
the wartime institutions produced a dramatic fall in the wage dispersion from 1940 to 1950 as the 
NWLB and other institutions homogenized wages (Goldin and Margo, 1992).  The legacies of the 
NWLB included both the procedures forced on businesses to promote unions, including checking 
off union dues, and the formative experience of many people involved with the NWLB who went 
on to become labor-relations experts after the war (Harris, 1982, Chap. 2; Edelstein, 2000).   
  As the war drew to a close, many feared that the end of wartime strike controls would 
bring labor market disruption and the potential for a second Great Depression.  Hoping to avoid 
this outcome, President Truman convened a three-week National Labor-Management Conference 
in November 1945 to discuss post-war labor relations (Harris, 1982, Chap. 4). From today’s 
perspective, two features of the conference stand out.  The first was the small guest list – 36 
business, labor and public officials. The short list was commentary on both the oligopolistic, 
regulated structure of industry and the concentration of union power.  As Katz and Lipsky (1998) 
write:  
Truman’s notion that an elite tri-partite group could ‘furnish a broad and permanent 
foundation for industrial peace and progress’ apparently was widely shared by the press 
and general public. (p. 147)  
 
        The meeting’s second important feature was the implication that even in peacetime, 
business-labor relations would remain a tri-partite process with government actively involved   21
with government as the third man in the ring.
25 Truman did not expect business-labor 
tranquility—strikes were the reaffirmation of unions’ power. But Truman believed the 
government had to keep business-labor conflict within bounds for the economy to prosper. His 
authority on this matter was enhanced by the heavy regulation of interstate transportation, 
telecommunication and some other industries.  While the conference did not reach agreement on 
many specific proposals, Truman’s position received board support. An example is a statement 
made by Eric Johnston, president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce:   
Labor unions are woven into our economic pattern of American life, and collective 
bargaining is a part of the democratic process.  I say recognize this fact not only with our 
lips but with our hearts.
26  
 
These two characteristics would be codified in the Treaty of Detroit, a private treaty that 
codified and extended institutions for labor relations that had begun in the Depression and been 
enlarged in the very different environment of the war.  The continuity of these institutions 
suggests strongly that they were not the result of individual historical accidents, but rather the 
outcome of complex negotiations and bargaining between the government, big business, and 
unions. 
For example, Truman retained a high top bracket income tax rate on labor income in 
another extension of Depression-era policy. As Frydman and Saks (2005) and others have noted, 
tax rates are endogenous, reflecting in part the social norms of the time. The high top-bracket rate 
on labor income and an active government presence in the economy were clear signals to limit 
high salaries. In their historical study of executive compensation (including the value of options)  
Frydman and Saks (2005) write:   
 [Our econometric ] results suggest that, had tax rates been at their year 2000 level 
for the entire sample period, the level of executive compensation would have been 
35 percent higher in the 1950s and 1960s. (p. 31, brackets added) 
                                              
25 The phase refers to the referee in a boxing match. See, for example, Goldstein 1959. 
26 Erik Johnston, President’s National Labor-Management Conference, 1946, General Committee, 52.  quoted in Katz 
and Lipsky (1988) See also, Harris (1982)..   22
 
We return shortly to the interaction of tax rates and norms. 
       Despite Truman’s best efforts, the postwar transition was difficult. At the war’s end, 
organized labor erupted with an average 3.1% of the workforce involved each year in work 
stoppages between 1947 and 1949 (Figure 8). The conflict, however, only modestly diluted public 
support for unions.
27  Business, for its part, supported the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 which defined 
restrictive administrative policies to constrain unions.  Although the Taft-Hartley Act clearly 
rolled back some union gains from the Depression and war, it fell far short of dismantling them 
entirely. 
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  It was in this context, in late 1948, that Walter Reuther and his advocates assumed control 
over the United Auto Workers (UAW).  The relationship between the UAW and the “Big Three” 
                                              
27  People remained strongly supportive unions per se but a significant proportion favored restraining their power. In 
1949, the Gallup Poll asked: “As things stand today, do you think the laws governing labor unions are too strict or not 
strict enough?”    Too Strict- 17%; About Right- 24%, Not Strict Enough  46%, No Opinion – 13%. Roper Accession 
Number 0170069   23
automakers (Ford, GM, and Chrysler), previously plagued by turmoil, entered a new phase of 
negotiation.  Reuther, an experienced labor leader, hoped to overhaul industrial relations in favor 
of labor interests, but the postwar setting created significant obstacles for his social vision.  
Workers faced dramatic inflation, wages remained inert, and the government’s cold-war spending 
policy indicated the situation would not improve. 
  Charles Wilson, the CEO of GM, was aware that inflationary pressures generated by cold 
war military spending promised to be a permanent feature of the economic scene.  GM had 
recently begun a $3.5 billion expansion program that depended on production stability, and stress 
created by inflation could instigate the unions to interrupt production with a devastating strike.  
Reuther had also recently survived an assassination attempt, indicating to GM the UAW’s internal 
fissures.  For Wilson, a long-term wage concession would be a profitable exchange for guaranteed 
production stability (Lichtenstein, 1995).    
  GM’s two-year proposal to the UAW included an increase in wages and two concepts 
intended to keep wages up over time.  The first, a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA), would allow 
wages to be influenced by changes in the Consumer Price Index, adjusting for rising inflation.  
Second, a two-percent annual improvement factor (AIF) was introduced, which would increase 
wages every year in an attempt to allow workers to benefit from productivity gains.  The UAW, in 
exchange, would allow management control over production and investment decisions, 
surrendering job assignment seniority and the right to protest reassignments.  Reuther and his 
advisors initially opposed the plan, believing the AIF formula to be too low and the deal to be a 
profiteer’s bribe signaling the end of overall reform.  Workers needed assistance, however, and 
Reuther agreed to the plan and wage formulas, but “only because most of those in control of 
government and industry show no signs of acting in the public interest.  They are enforcing a   24
system of private planning for private profit at public expense” (Lichtenstein, 1995).  The contract 
was signed in May, 1948. 
  For the next two years, labor saw wage increases and gains from productivity.  GM 
enjoyed smooth, increasing production, and established a net income record for a US corporation 
in 1949 (Amberg, 1994).  When the time period for the contract ended, the UAW and GM readily 
agreed to a similar plan that included several changes.  A pension plan was initiated, initially 
through Ford in 1949, which had an older workforce and progressive managers (Lichtenstein, 
1987).  The resulting plan was presented to GM as a precedent to create industrial conformity in a 
process known as pattern bargaining.  GM agreed readily, and the last of the “Big Three,” 
Chrysler, agreed after an expensive strike. Agreements to the pension plan ultimately spread to 
other industries, including rubber, Bethlehem Steel, and then U.S. Steel (Amberg, 1994).  In 
addition to the pension plan, GM increased the COLA/AIF formulas and paid for half of a new 
health insurance program.  The final, five-year UAW-GM agreement was named the “Treaty of 
Detroit” by Fortune magazine:  “GM may have paid a billion for peace but it got a bargain.  
General Motors has regained control over one of the crucial management functions… long range 
scheduling of production, model changes, and tool and plant investment.”  Wage adjustments and 
productivity gains became recognized as necessary and just, union membership increased, and 
industry reaped the profits from the Treaty of Detroit’s stability (Lichtenstein, 1995). 
  The Korean War’s outbreak in 1950 immediately threatened the agreement as the UAW 
and GM had to intervene to prevent the government from freezing wages.  Inflationary 
adjustments during Korea were not fully reflected by the COLA formula, causing disappointment 
in the UAW.  Other issues created by the Treaty of Detroit also caused friction, specifically the 
emphasis on debating national policy over local factory floor issues.  The UAW shifted its focus, 
fighting for standardized monetary and fringe benefits while workers became frustrated over shop   25
terms and job assignments.  The problem was exacerbated by the bureaucratization of grievance 
disputes, which created a backlog of complaints about daily working conditions.    
  Despite these problems, the Treaty of Detroit initiated a stable period of industrial 
relations.  The use of collective bargaining spread throughout industry, and even non-union firms 
approximated the conditions achieved by unions in an extension of pattern bargaining.  Although 
the strict application of this term refers to the dynamics of union negotiations in large firms, a 
looser version was pervasive (Chamberlain and Kuhn, 1986).  The NLRA provided a regulatory 
framework for labor to organize a significant part of the industrial labor force.   
This framework was administered by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), set up 
in 1935 under the NLRA.  Congress explicitly rejected a partisan board composed of labor and 
management representatives and opted instead for “impartial government members.”  This 
concept lasted only two decades, however, and President Eisenhower, the first Republican 
president after Roosevelt, appointed management people to the NLRB.  This violation of the 
original intent of the board was controversial, and the seeds of future controversy were planted, 
but the neutrality of the board was more or less preserved (Flynn, 2000). 
Unions acknowledged the exclusive right of management to determine the direction of 
production in return for the right to negotiate the impact of managerial decisions.  Unions were 
able to craft an elaborate set of local rules that constrained management in its allocation of jobs 
and bolstered the power of unions over jobs (Kochan, 1980; Weinstein and Kochan, 1995). 
Simultaneously, managers used the framework of the Treaty of Detroit to tighten their grasp on 
production decisions.  The inclusion of supplementary unemployment benefits in production 
decisions in 1955 gave managers even more control over job descriptions and workplace 
decisions, as unions conceded these rights in exchange for direct welfare.  Labor complaints had   26
to go through paperwork, and the burden to oppose or modify change was placed on the workers 
(Brody, 1980). 
           The impact of this framework is clear in the pattern of relative wages.  Eckstein and 
Wilson found in a study of nominal wages in the 1950s that,  
“Wages in a group of heavy industries, which we call the key group, move 
virtually identically because of the economic, political and institutional interdependence 
among the companies and the unions in these industries…. Wages in some other industries 
outside this group are largely determined by spillover effects of the key group wages and 
economic variables applicable to the industry” (Eckstein and Wilson, 1962).   
 
         Changes in these pattern wages were determined by economic variables, according to 
Eckstein and Wilson, but the same forces that kept industrial wages in a stable pattern likely 
affected the extent of overall wage changes as well.  Erickson (1996) extended the concept of 
pattern bargaining to include specific contract provisions.  He found that they also were 
remarkably similar at both inter- and intra-industry levels in the 1970s, although not in the 1980s 
as we will see.  Katznelson (2005) however reminds us that this pattern of stable conditions and 
wages did not extend to all corners of the economy.  Black workers and other minority groups 
were largely ignored in these negotiations.   
         Steadily rising wages did not eliminate labor-management conflict (Figure 8). As we have 
suggested, the causality ran in the opposite direction with the threat of strike activity motivating 
wage growth. By the late 1950s, American business was facing increased global competition and 
pressure to minimize labor costs, particularly as the economy was entering recession. Business 
also sensed that union momentum might be weakening.
28 In response to these circumstances, 
business increased their demands and rigidity to create “the Hard Line” in 1958, sparking a series 
of strikes (Jacoby, 1997). 
                                              
28 Though the public, on balance was still supportive. In 1958, 64 percent of respondents to a Gallup Poll question 
said they were in favor of labor unions, 21 percent disapproved, 13 percent had no opinion 1 percent gave no answer. 
Result reported as Roper Center Accession Number 0036121   27
         Work stoppages eased modestly in the early 1960s as the Kennedy/Johnson administration 
stimulated the economy through a pair of tax cuts on investment and incomes respectively.  
Because the tax cuts were a first application of Keynesian policy, government economists were 
particularly concerned about the potential for inflation. To address this possibility, the Kennedy 
Council of Economic Advisors announced as a set of wage-price guideposts explicitly suggesting 
how productivity gains should translate into wage and price decisions. 1966, Walter Heller, the 
first chairman of Kennedy’s Council of Economic Advisors, wrote about the policy: 
     One cannot say exactly how much of the moderation in wages and prices in 
1961-65 should be attributed to the guideposts. But one can say that their 
educational impact has been impressive. They have significantly advanced the 
rationality of the wage-price dialogue. 
 
   In business, the guideposts have contributed, first, to a growing recognition that 
rising wages are not synonymous with rising costs per unit of output. As long as 
the pay for an hour’s work does not rise faster than the product of an hour’s work, 
rising wages are consistent with stable or falling unit-labor costs. Second, they are 
helping lay to rest the old fallacy that “if productivity rises 3 percent and wages 
rise 3 percent, labor is harvesting all the fruits of productivity” Guideposts thinking 
makes it clear that a 3-percent rise in labor’s total compensation, which is about 
three fifths of private GNP, still leaves a 3-percent gain on the remaining two fifths 
– enough to provide ample rewards to capital, as is vividly demonstrated by the 
double of corporate profits after taxes in the five years between the first quarters of 
1961 and 1966. (Heller, 1967, p. 44, italics in the original). 
 
        The wage-price guideposts were one of a number of the government’s continued interest in 
promoting economic norms. Another was Kennedy’s 1962 public confrontation with U.S. Steel 
over steel price increases. The price increase came shortly after Kennedy had persuaded the 
United Steel Workers to accept a moderate wage settlement. Kennedy responded to the perceived 
betrayal with a blistering press conference – including the second quote that opened this paper – 
and the threat of sanctions using government procurement policy.
29 Ultimately, the price increases 
were rescinded.  
                                              
29 See the transcript of Kennedy’s press conference on April 11, 1962: 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Press+Conferences/003POF05Pressconfer
ence30_04111962.htm   28
        This history is relevant to current debates over the interpretation of growing income share 
claimed by the top 1 percent of taxpayers. Feenberg and Poterba (1993) and Gordon and Slemrod 
(1998) have argued that this income concentration is to some extent, an artifact of tax law 
changes.  Reynolds (2007) recently argued that all of the recent growth in high-end inequality is a 
tax law artifact.
30 Since changes in tax laws frequently reflect changes in societal norms, a focus 
on tax laws alone potentially misses important parts of the story.  
       In this connection, the 1964 tax cut (ultimately passed under Lyndon Johnson) represents a 
natural experiment. The legislation included a sharp reduction on the top rate for labor income 
(Figure 7) at a time when a CEO receiving a radically increased paycheck risked White House 
criticism. That risk helps to explain why the reduced top tax rate produced no surge in either 
executive compensation or high incomes per se (Frydman and Saks, 2005; Saez 2005). A related 
experiment occurred in 1992 when the Clinton administration’s tax legislation significantly 
increased the top marginal rate at a time when the White House showed no inclination to criticize 
high incomes. Despite the increased top bracket rate, the share of income claimed by the top 1 
percent of tax returns continued to rise rapidly.  
        While initially successful, the Kennedy-Johnson macroeconomic policies were soon 
overwhelmed by events. In 1965, the government began deficit-financing the Vietnam War in an 
economy that was already near full employment. By 1969, unemployment had fallen to 3.5 
percent and consumer prices were rising at a then high 5.4 percent. In a tight labor market, 
debates over automation became increasingly common, as new technology fueled the power 
struggle between unions and management for control of decision making and the right to adapt to 
change (Lichtenstein, 2002). Strike activity surged (Figure 8).  
 
                                              
30 See the Appendix for a discussion of this issue including an evaluation of Reynolds’ argument.    29
 
IV – 1970- 2005 –Institutional Change at the End of the Golden Age 
      The Depression-era institutions and norms that compressed income differences stayed in place 
for the first three decades after World War II because the economy was producing rising incomes 
for most groups  - in particular for the average worker.  Figure 9 displays three measures of the 
economy’s performance measured in 2005 dollars (rather than normalized by productivity) – the 
median compensation of 35-44 year old male high school graduates and of 35-44 year-old male 
BA’s, and the Piketty-Saez estimate of the 99.5
th  percentile of personal income reported on tax 
returns, adjusted for fringe benefits and excluding capital gains. Note the uniformly rising series 
before the productivity slowdown of the 1970s. 
      The median compensation of male high school graduates – the group most affected by unions 
and the minimum wage – increased from $24,145 in 1950 to $46,994 in 1973 (+94%).  Consistent 
with our discussion of high top tax rates and norms, the 99.5
th percentile compensation (with 
adjustment for fringes) was the slowest growing of the three measures increasing from $163,259 
to $221,229  (+ 35%).  The median compensation of the male college graduates - the group least 
affected by institutions - rose from $34,235 to $70,512 (+105%).     30
Figure 9
Median Compensation for 35-44 Male BA's and HS Graduates 
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     This broad-based income growth benefited daily economic life in three main dimensions:         
-  An Expanding the Middle Class. By 1964, 44 percent of the population reported itself as 
middle class, up from 37 percent in 1952. The expanding middle class did not reflect 
significantly more equal incomes,
31 but rather rapid income growth in which more 
families could afford a single family home, one or more cars, and the other elements of a 
middle class lifestyle.    
        
-  Mass Upward Mobility.  A number of studies have shown that intergenerational mobility 
within the U.S. income distribution is relatively limited (e.g. Solon 2002). But rapidly 
rising incomes created a mass upward mobility such that a blue collar machine operator in 
the early 1970s earned more in real terms than most managers had earned in 1950. Much 
of a generation could live better than its parents had lived even though their relative 
positions in the income distribution were similar. 
32 
 
-  A Safety Net for Industrial Change. In any period, losing a job and finding another can 
result in an immediate pay cut reflecting the lost value of firm-specific human capital. 
When wages were rising rapidly, a person could take a pay cut and “grow back” into their 
                                              
31 While the 99 ½th percentile income had grown slowly, the 95’th and 90’th percentile incomes grew in line with 
incomes of the middle of the distribution.  See Piketty and Saez, op. cit. 
32 In the golden age, perceptions of upward mobility were enhanced because the expectations of many people had 
been formed in the Great Depression.    31
old pay level in a reasonably short time. When wages are “stagnant” recovery can take 
much longer strengthening perceptions of a lack of good jobs (Uchitelle, 2006). 
 
      In periods of stagnant wages, these virtues are much harder to come by.
33  And by 1970-71, 
the economy’s declining ability to produce such benefits was becoming clear. The excessive 
stimulation of late 1960s – the Vietnam War deficits – had led to inflationary expectations that 
were impervious to normal recessions – what would become known as stagflation.  Additional 
problems followed in quick succession: an inflationary supply shock in food (1972-3), another 
supply shock in oil (1973-4) and, most important, the collapse of productivity growth after 1973.  
By 1975, the unemployment rate had reached 8.5 percent, and inflation was increasing at 8.2 
percent. Most incomes had stopped rising (Figure 9). Economic problems topped the Gallup 
Poll’s list of the nation’s biggest problem for the first time since 1946.
34 
As with the Great Depression, policy makers faced stagflation with little relevant history 
to serve as a guide. Economic theory had followed Keynes in focusing on demand shifts, and 
there was no theory of the supply side that related to economic policy.  Only in the mid-1970s 
was the concept of aggregate supply developed to extend the standard IS-LM model.  And as with 
the Great Depression, the resulting policy agenda was heavily microeconomic. To combat slow 
productivity growth, some economists began to argue for economic restructuring including 
removing what they saw as the rigidities of New Deal institutions: unions imposing work rules; a 
regulatory regime covering most of the nation’s utilities, telecommunications and interstate 
transportation; and high marginal tax rates that they assumed reduced work effort.  
Jimmy Carter argued in 1978 that, “The two most important measures the Congress can 
pass to prevent inflation … (are) the airline deregulation bill … (and) hospital cost containment 
legislation.” He appointed Alfred E. Kahn, chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, to head the 
                                              
33  Immigrants clearly find their jobs improved in these ways by entering the U.S. labor force. But this is an example 
of cross-section variation of wages and working conditions, while this paper is about time-series variation. 
34 See, for example, Roper Center Accession Number 0026306, May 16, 1976.   32
administration’s anti-inflation program.  Kahn’s field was government regulation, and his plans 
were to reduce regulations that supported monopoly pricing (Carter, 1978; Cowan, 1978).  We do 
not want to equate Carter and Roosevelt or even economic theory in the 1970s and 1930s.  
Instead, we note that unusual macroeconomic events sometimes transcend existing 
macroeconomic theory.  Before macroeconomics could be expanded—to include the aggregate 
supply curve in the 1970s—public policy appears to have focused on perceived microeconomic 
problems.    
In what is now known as the Washington Consensus on economic policy, deregulation 
plays a prominent role.  The impact of deregulation on wages was not much discussed in the 
1970s because blue collar wages, in particular, continued to do fairly well. On the labor market’s 
supply side, male high school graduates remained heavily unionized   (~  42 percent – authors’ 
tabulations) with unionization among female high school graduates at 17 percent. On the labor 
market’s demand side, the food and oil supply shocks had stimulated the energy and agricultural 
industries while a declining international value of the dollar was expanding global demand for 
U.S. manufacturing goods.
35 Strong manufacturing, energy and agricultural sectors created what 
economic geographers were calling a “Rural Renaissance” (Long and DeAre, 1988) in which the 
nation’s heartland was doing well, with heavy demand for blue collar workers, while the east and 
west coasts were stagnant.
36  
In reality the Rural Renaissance was a blue collar bubble. High demands for agriculture 
and domestic energy were temporary while the falling dollar was masking manufacturing’s 
                                              
35 In 1971, Richard Nixon had abandoned fixed exchange rates as part of his program to deal with inflation, a 
recognition of the fact that continuing trade deficits were diminishing the country’s exchange reserves.  
36 Even at the time it was clear that some of this success was unsustainable. In the early 1970s’ both the auto workers 
and steel workers unions had signed new contracts in which full cost-of-living adjustments were exchanged for 
promises of labor peace. At that time, no one anticipated consumer prices doubling over the next ten years. As a 
result, auto makers and big steel firms became an island in the economy with real wages far higher than even most 
other unionized occupations. Had exchange rates fallen far enough to bring overall trade flows into balance, auto and 
big steel would still have been overpriced on world markets.  
   33
competitive weakness.  Unions, perhaps lulled by this temporary prosperity, largely ignored the 
need to organize a changing labor market. As labor force composition shifted toward women and 
college graduates, many in the service sector, union membership fell to about 27 percent of all 
wage and salary workers (private and public), down from 35 percent at the peak of their post-war 
strength (Osterman, 1999; Hirsch and Macpherson, 2004).    
The failure of a bill to reform labor law in 1978 reveals the change in opinion that was 
underway.  The bill proposed a large set of small, technical changes in labor law that could have 
preserved the legal framework in which the Treaty of Detroit labor system had operated.  Despite 
the small scale of the bill, business mounted a large, inflammatory public campaign against it.  
The bill nevertheless passed the House by a vote of 257 to 163, and it would have passed the 
Senate as well.  But employers took a hard line against the bill and arranged to have it stopped by 
a filibuster.  After a 19-day filibuster, the bill’s supporters failed in their sixth try to muster 60 
votes to stop it and sent the bill back to committee to die (Mills, 1979).  The AFL-CIO’s failure to 
pass this bill demonstrates that while labor still had the support of most political representatives, it 
no longer had enough support to offset the blocking actions in the federal government.  In 
particular, employers no longer felt the need to share the accommodating views expressed by the 
president of the US Chamber of Commerce during Truman’s 1945 conference. 
For the remainder of the 1970s, the economy continued to limp along. Unemployment fell 
slowly, and weak productivity growth translated economic expansion into additional inflation. By 
1979, consumer prices were increasing at 12 percent annually. Shaken financial markets forced 
Carter to appoint Paul Volcker, an inflation hawk, as Chairman of the Federal Reserve. Volcker 
quickly instituted a strong tight money policy to break inflation quickly. When, in 1980, Carter 
was defeated by Ronald Reagan, Volcker’s and Reagan’s policies combined to help dismantle 
much of what remained of New Deal institutions and norms.   34
           In Reagan’s first year in office, he made three decisions that proved central to wage 
determination. He gave Volcker’s anti-inflation policy his full backing. He introduced a set of 
supply-side tax cuts including lowering the top income tax on non-labor income from 70 to 50 
percent to align it with the top rate on labor income. And when the air traffic controllers union, 
one of the few unions to support Reagan, went out on strike, he gave them 48 hours to return to 
work or be fired. His stance ultimately led to the union’s decertification.   
           The firing of the air traffic controllers, combined with the 1978 defeat of labor law reform 
where signals that that the third man–government–was leaving the ring. From that point on, 
business and would fight over rewards in free market with most workers in an increasingly weak 
position. Then, in an unanticipated development, Volker’s tight money policy weakened blue 
collar workers’ position further. 
With Reagan’s strong backing, Volcker’s policy reduced inflation far more rapidly than 
most economists had predicted–from 12.5 percent in 1980 to 3.8 percent in 1982.  But by 1982, 
Reagan’s tax cuts, combined with little expenditure reduction had led to projections of large 
future deficits. Financial markets, fearing the deficits would be monetized, kept interest rates high 
even as inflation fell.
37  High real interest rates increased global demand for U.S. securities and 
the dollars required to buy them. Between 1979 and 1984, the trade-weighted value of the dollar 
rose by 55 percent.   
The result was perhaps fifteen years of normal change compressed into five years.  U.S. 
durable manufacturing firms – a pillar of private sector unionization – were hit first by the deep 
recession and then by the high dollar that crippled export sales. The Rural Renaissance of the 
1970s became the Rust Belt of the 1980s. The loss of old line manufacturing jobs combined with 
new employer boldness to put unions under siege. The fraction of all private sector wage and 
                                              
37  By 1982, the real interest on three year government securities exceeded 6 percent – three times its normal postwar 
value.   35
salary workers in unions fell from 23 percent in 1979 to 16 percent in 1985 (Hirsh and 
Macpherson, 2004).  The unionization rate among male high school graduates fell from 44 to 32 
percent (authors’ tabulations). 
         Underscoring the shift in nation’s industrial structure, equally dramatic growth was 
underway the nation’s financial sector. Labor’s weakened position suggested improved corporate 
profits while reduced tax rates on non-labor income further enhanced stocks’ attractiveness. 
Between 1980 and 1990, the Dow Jones Industrial Index rose from 875 to 2,785, a boom to the 
brokerage industry. Simultaneously, the high interest rates and big federal deficits of the early 
1980s stimulated government securities trading and the market for corporate takeovers, creating 
demand for financial traders, investment bankers and corporate legal services.
38  Between 1980 
and 1995, the share of economy-wide compensation and profits in the Finance, Insurance and 
Real Estate Industry rose from 6.75 percent to 10.03 percent while Manufacturing’s share fell 
from 27.9 percent to 20.4 percent.    
          It can be argued that this industrial shift automatically stimulated inequality since the 
earnings of lawyers (Figure 2) and financial professionals are subject to the extreme inequality of 
winner-take-all markets.
39  We believe the development was not automatic and that changing 
norms played an important role.     
       We have seen that norms, coupled with high marginal tax rates, restrained winner-take-all 
salaries prior to 1980. Once norms shifted and very big compensation packages became 
acceptable, winner-take-all markets created some high salaries but they were also invoked to 
justify other high salaries that resulted from non-market sources of economic power – for 
example CEO’s who benefited from pliant compensation committees Thus Gabaix and Landier 
(2007) argue that the rapid growth in CEO compensation since 1980 reflects a winner-take-all 
                                              
38 Blair and Schary (1993) describe how high real interest rates became a hurdle that many weakened corporations 
could not meet thereby inviting takeover activity.   
39 See footnote 14 as well as Marshall (1947), Rosen (1981) and Frank and Cook, 1995.      36
market operating in a time of rising firm equity value where increasing amounts of money ride on 
each decision. Frydman and Saks (2005), analyzing a longer historical period, show that rising 
equity values translated into higher CEO compensation at a much lower rate prior to 1980, a time 
of more restrained norms.  
Many of Reagan’s supporters acknowledged his policies would lead to inequality, but they 
argued that inequality was the price of revived productivity growth.  Most people would see rising 
incomes while the incomes of the rich would rise faster. Consistent with the booming stock 
market and rapidly rising CEO compensation (Frydman and Saks, 2005), the 99½th percentile of 
reported taxpayer income increased from $175,000 in 1980 to $220,000 in 1988 (Figure 9).
40  At 
the same time, labor productivity continued its weak growth while the compensation of male high 
school graduates, in particular, declined sharply- the sharp 1980 break in trend for male high 
school graduates illustrated in Figure 4.  
Because a rising tide was supposed to lift all boats, there was no thought given to ex-post 
redistribution. To the contrary, Reagan’s administration allowed the minimum wage to reach an 
historical low relative to output per worker (Figure 6). In a similar way, the NLRB became more 
polarized, moving away from the impartial model that characterized the board’s early years.  The 
seeds planted under Eisenhower flowered under Reagan.  Reagan broke with tradition and 
appointed a management consultant who specialized in defeating unions to be the chairman of the 
NLRB.  The result is that the NLRB increasingly reflected current political trends.  
Lee (1999) among others has argued that the falling value of minimum wage was a 
significant determinant of inequality during this period. We take the broader position advanced by 
Autor, Katz and Kearny (2005) that increased inequality reflected a change in regime of which the 
falling minimum wage was part.  
                                              
40 Figures in 2005 dollars. As we note in the Appendix, some of the timing of these increases reflects changing tax 
laws – in particular the Tax Reform Act of 1986..    37
An important indicator of this new regime was the dramatic fall-off strike activity.
41 In the 
1970s, an average 1.7 percent of the labor force was involved annually in work stoppages (Figure 
8). In the 1980s, this rate fell by more than two-thirds to .5 percent.  Even as the number of union 
complaints of unfair labor practices was rising, the politicization of the NLRB had sharply 
reduced the economic return to work stoppages and discouraged workers from attempting them 
(Flynn, 2000; Roomkin, 1981).  The rapid fall underestimates the decline in work stoppages as 
expressions of union power as strikes increasingly became expressions of union despair – e.g. the 
strike against the Greyhound Corporation--rather than efforts to improve working conditions 
(Kochan, Katz and McKersie, 1994).   
The sharp decline in male high school graduate earnings caused economists to focus the 
on the declining demand for less educated workers and the relationship between growing 
inequality and educational differences (Levy, 1988, 1989; Katz and Murphy 1992; Juhn Murphy 
and Pierce, 1993). These analyses ignored the point that began this paper: Since in the mid-1970s, 
a growing fraction of male BA’s also now faced demand that was too weak to keep compensation 
growing in line with productivity (Figure 3).  
By the early 1980s, then, demand for most groups of workers was too weak to keep 
average compensation growing in line with productivity. At the same time, labor market 
institutions were too weak to achieve a more equal distribution of the gains from growth.  The 
declining bargaining power of the average worker has resulted in two observable changes: a shift 
of income from labor to capital and a shift of both labor and capital income to the top of the 
income distribution.
42  
          The outlines of our story have persisted through the present. Bill Clinton, the only 
Democratic president since 1980, encouraged the Washington Consensus in his centrist positions 
                                              
41 Osterman (1999) chapter 2 makes a similar point.  
42 See the Appendix for further discussion.    38
extending deregulation in the United States and—to the extent possible—in the world as a whole. 
He took important measures of ex-post redistribution by expanding the Earned Income Tax 
Credit, increasing the minimum wage, and increasing the top income-tax rate, but  George W. 
Bush partially reversed the last two elements. 
Clinton’s time in office was also marked by two macro developments – one transitory, the 
other permanent that are now part of our story. Permanent was the growing potential to offshore 
service work, which, together with advances in computerized work, increased substitution 
possibilities for U.S. workers at all educational levels. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in recent 
years, both offshoring and the threat of offshoring serve to further weaken bargaining power and 
suppress wage demands.   
The second macro development was the dot.com boom of the 1997-2000 in which the 
unemployment rate averaged 4.4 percent. During this period, very tight labor markets increased 
most groups’ bargaining power and median compensation for BA’s and high school graduates  
briefly rose faster than productivity (Figures 3 and 4).  While the period produced great benefits, 
it also suggested a sobering lesson: As technical change and trade continue to evolve and labor 
market institutions remain weak, it requires a labor market boom – a relatively rare event – to 
produce a distribution of productivity gains that occurred routinely under the Treaty of Detroit. 
 
V. Conclusions 
  We have argued in this paper that the current trend toward greater inequality in America is 
primarily the result of a change in economic policy that took place in the late 1970s and early 
1980s.  The stability in income equality where wages rose with national productivity for a 
generation after the Second World War was the result of policies that began in the Great 
Depression with the New Deal and were amplified by both public and private actions after the   39
war.  This stability was not the result of a natural economy; it was the result of policies designed 
to promote it.  We have termed this set of policies the Treaty of Detroit.  
  The new policies, which we have grouped under the title of the Washington Consensus, 
also originated in a time of economic distress, albeit nowhere near the distress of the 1930s.  In a 
process similar to the experience of the Great Depression, policy makers—unable to comprehend 
the macroeconomic causes of distress—instituted microeconomic changes in an attempt to 
ameliorate the macroeconomic problems.  In both cases, the measures taken were only partially 
successful, and recovery came from diverse influences.  The microeconomic changes, however, 
had durable impacts on the distribution of economic production.  
       These microeconomic changes were not inevitable.  Labor-market institutions appear to have 
many national idiosyncrasies.  Lindert (2004) showed that different labor-market institutions in 
Western Europe and America are compatible with similar rates of economic growth.  Nickell 
(1997) demonstrated that different labor-market institutions within Western Europe are 
compatible with similar rates of unemployment. Saez (2004) shows that rapidly rising incomes 
among the very rich appear in the U.S. , England and Canada (largely in response to U.S. 
competition.) but do not appear in most continental European countries or Japan.   
  Globalization clearly does not determine institutions.  Some economists and commentators 
have asserted that globalization has made more than one set of institutions not viable.  Yet the 
variety of institutions that form the right-hand side of Lindert’s and Nickell’s regressions shows 
no sign of disappearing.  Their work suggests further that it may not even be costly to preserve a 
preferred set of labor-market institutions, in contrast to the assertions of globalization enthusiasts. 
  Finally, economic shocks do not determine institutions.  The Vietnam War and the oil 
shocks deranged the international economy.  Yet countries responded to these shocks in 
idiosyncratic ways.  The contrast between the US and Japan in the 1970s is only one example of   40
the great diversity.  Economic shocks can affect policy, and the shocks of the 1970s may have 
accelerated institutional change, but there is no indication that it forced counties to adopt 
homogenous labor-market institutions.  It did, however, create opportunities for political choices 
to change institutions, and we chronicle the results in the US. 
  Deregulation, floating exchange rates, international capital mobility, low minimum wages 
and taxes, and the destruction of labor unions, were not unique responses to the oil crisis or the 
productivity collapse.  The effects of these policies have been amplified by skill biased technical 
change and, in the extreme, winner-take-all markets..  But the technology did not fully determine 
who received the rents produced any more than technology fully determined who got the rents 
from the great postwar expansion.  As we noted, African-Americans were largely excluded from 
the GI Bill and other public policies by a series of political and bureaucratic actions (Katznelson, 
2005). 
  We noted earlier how a rising income made fluctuations in the income of wage earners 
easier.  The inability of workers to maintain this rising average standard of living now makes the 
uncertainty of working life harder to bear.  This side effect of the trends in Figure 1 has been 
accentuated in two ways.  The uncertainty of working may well have increased under the new 
institutions.  It is harder to measure second moments than first ones, and conclusions are not firm.  
They do however suggest strongly greater uncertainty (Gottschalk and Moffitt, 1994).  The 
American dream of income mobility—the rags to riches story that made the United States an 
exceptional place to live and work—has become less likely as intergeneration income mobility 
has decreased.  There now is no more mobility in the US than in Europe (Solon, 2002; Ferrie, 
2005). 
The elements of the Washington Consensus were adopted in the name of improving 
economic efficiency. But there is growing recognition that the current free-market income   41
distribution – the combination of large inequalities and stagnant wages for many workers – 
creates its own “soft” inefficiencies as people become disenchanted with existing economic 
arrangements. As Stephen Pearlstein (2006) writes:  
Up to now, Americans have put up with more income inequality than Europeans, 
Canadians or Japanese. But their tolerance is wearing thin as they see Wall Street sharpies 
and corporate executives getting fabulously rich by undercutting the economic security of 
the working poor and middle class. Not only are job security, private pensions and 
employer-provided health care coverage being cut back, but there is also a noticeable 
erosion in the public services that serve as a backstop—schools and colleges, 
transportation, health, recreation, job training, and food stamps. Many citizens feel they 
are now walking an economic tightrope, without a net, and it is this—more than mansion-
envy—that animates their anxiety. 
 
        The Washington Consensus thus has come under fire recently as people suffering from 
stagnant incomes —both here an in some similar countries—have begun to protest.  Our analysis 
suggests that the trends in the distribution derive in part from the shift from one complex of 
policies to another—from the Treaty of Detroit to the Washington Consensus.  There is no single 
determinant, whether education, minimum wage, capital or labor mobility, that determines the 
path of income distribution.  Any specific measure therefore can alleviate the distress of some 
people, but it cannot change the overall distributional trends shown in our graphs. 
  Only a reorientation of government policy can restore the general prosperity of the 
postwar boom, can recreate a more equitable distribution of productivity gains where a rising tide 
lifts all boats. The precise form of this reorientation is not yet clear. The preferred solution of the 
Washington Consensus is to let markets function and to redistribute ex post – the winners 
compensating the losers.  Missing in this technical description is a discussion of the politics and 
leadership necessary for passage of ex post redistribution.  
   The last six years of federal tax history have involved an inhospitable politics in which 
winners have used their political power to expand their winnings. But political sentiment does 
shift. Economic distress like the 1930s can induce such a shift.  Even the smaller economic   42
distress of the 1970s was enough to redirect American economic policy.  Only time will tell if 
more economic distress is needed to change policy yet again. 
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Appendix  
 
A) The Bargaining Power Index (BPI) 
The Bargaining Power Index described in Equation 1 and graphed in Figure 1 has the form:  
 
                  Median Annual Compensation for Full-Time WorkersT 
                  Annualized Value of Output per Hour in the Non-Farm Business SectorT  
 
As described in the text, the index can be thought of, roughly, as the share of average output per 
worker in the economy claimed by the median full-time worker as compensation.
43  
To form this index, we calculated a numerator and denominator in nominal dollars for 
each year for which data was available - the 1950 and 1960 Decennial Census and Current 
Population Surveys for 1961 and 1963 onward.   
The BPI numerator was constructed by first constructing the median weekly earnings of 
all full-time workers and multiplying the resulting median by 52 weeks.
44 To adjust this statistic 
for fringes, each year’s median was inflated by a percentage equal to:  
                        Supplements to Wages and SalariesT 
                        Wage and Salary DisbursementsT 
where Supplements to Wages and Salaries measure the value of fringe benefits and both series  in 
this ratio are taken from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). By applying the 
same ratio to all workers, we ignore the facts that the self-employed typically do not receive 
supplementary benefits and high income workers are relatively more likely than lower wage 
workers to receive fringe benefits (e.g. Pierce , 1999).
45 
                                              
43 The description is not quite accurate since focusing on output per worker in the non-farm business sector – the 
standard basis for productivity - excludes the value of government output due to difficulties in measuring output. 
44 A full-time worker is one who normally works 35 or more hours per week but they need not work full-year. To 
avoid confounding compensation changes with changes in weeks worked, we multiplied weekly earnings by 52 
weeks to base examples on year-round full-time workers.  
45 For example, among 35-44 year old male BA’s (including the self employed), who had median earnings +/- 20%, 
90% reported receiving employer provided health insurance trending down to 80% in 2004. Among 35-44 year old   49
In government data, Non-Farm Business Sector Productivity (i.e. the value output per hour 
of work) is reported as a index number – not a nominal or real dollar amount. To construct the 
nominal dollar amount for each year, we first computed the nominal value of 1950 output in the 
Non-Farm Business Sector divided by Persons Engaged in Production in the Non-Farm Business 
Section, an approximation
46 of the full-time equivalent workforce. This served as the denominator 
for 1950. We then applied the index of Non-Farm Business Productivity to this 1950 measure to 
construct real values of Non-Farm Business output per worker for all years from 1960 to 2005, 
expressed in 1950 dollars. We finally applied the GDP deflator to convert these 1950 real dollar 
values into the nominal value of output per full-time, full year workers - the denominator for each 
year.  
With respect to the 99 ½ percentile of income, fringe benefit adjustments were applied to 
the portion of that income that came from wages and salaries which we approximated as the 
fraction of income coming from wages and salaries between the 99’th and 99 ½th income 
percentiles (Piketty and Saez, Table A7
47). 
    
B) The Share of Post-1980 Personal Income Gains Received by the Top 1 Percent of Taxpayers 
 
As noted in the text, calculations using the updated Piketty-Saez data suggest that four-
fifths of all pre-tax, pre transfer personal between 1980 and 2005 (excluding capital gains) went 
to the top 1 percent of taxpayers. The calculations are as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                   
male high school graduates, the comparable numbers were 89% trending to 66 %. Among similar aged women who 
work full time, the comparable trends were (BA) 72% trending to 71% and (high school) 70% trending to 58%.  
46 We say “approximately” because in constructing Persons Engaged in Production, the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis converts all employee data (i.e. persons working for employers) into full-time equivalents but does not 
attempt a similar conversion for the self-employed who are added to the estimate on a one-for-one basis.  
47 All Appendix references are to the Pikkety-Saez data updated to 2005 and available on Emmanuel Saez web site - 
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/. The calculations are based directly on these data, which are adjusted for inflation 
using the Consumer Price Index. As noted in footnote 3, we adjust all other numbers in the current paper by the GDP 
deflator to avoid productivity-income differences that can be caused by the use of the GDP deflator for productivity 
and the Consumer Price Index used to deflate incomes. .     50
Pikkety and Saez (Table A0) report that in 1980, average income per tax unit rose from 
$40,774 to $46.806. a gain of $6,032 per tax filing unit. Thus a sample of 100 tax filing units 
would have an aggregate income gain of $603,200. In Table A4, the authors report that over the 
same years, the average income of in the top 1 percent of tax filing units rose from $317,607 to 
$812,497, a gain of $494,890. 
It follows that in a random sample of 100 tax filing units, the gain in average income of 
the top tax filer would equal ($494,890/$603,200) or 82 percent of the total gains of the group. 
 
C) Is Growing Income Concentration an Artifact of Tax Policy?   
  
As noted in the text, Feenberg and Poterba (1993) and Gordon and Slemrod (1998) 
have argued that the growing share of income received by the top 1 percent of tax filing 
units is to some extent an artifact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 1986). Reynolds 
(2007) recently argued that TRA 1986 induced behavior accounts for all growth in top 1 
percent incomes.   
These authors have two mechanisms in mind beginning with the timing of income 
realizations. High income individuals often have flexibility to postpone the realization of  
current income to a future date. The TRA broadened the tax base in exchange for lower 
rates (e.g. Figure 7). It is possible to argue that high income individuals responded to the 
lower rates by reporting income that otherwise would have been postponed. In this 
interpretation, the apparent growth income top 1 percent income after 1986 reflected 
income that was “already owned” but had not yet been realized. (An alternative 
interpretation, implicit in Frydman and Saks (2005) is that low tax encourages increased   51
high-end compensation by requiring fewer pre-tax dollars to, for example, raise CEO 
salaries by a given amount.)  
The second mechanism, suggested by Gordon and Slemrod and emphasized by 
Reynolds is the shifting of business income from Subchapter C to Subchapter S 
corporations. Subchapter C corporations are taxed as corporate income while income from 
Subchapter S corporations are reported as personal income and taxed at personal income 
tax rates. Prior to TRA 1986, claiming this income through Subchapter C corporations 
would have minimized taxes paid. The rate reductions in TRA 1986 reversed that 
calculation. Under Reynold’s interpretation, the surge top 1 percent incomes after 1986 
simply reflected income being reclassified as personal (Subchapter C) , rather than 
corporate (Subchapter C)  income.  
              Figure (A1) displays the composition by income type of the average (mean) 
income among the top 1 percent of tax filing units (figures exclude capital gains). The 
spike in entrepreneurial income from 1986 to 1988, immediately following the passage of 
TRA 1986, almost certainly reflects tax shifting of the kind described above. But since 
TRA 1986 was a one-time change, one would expect this shift to be concentrated in a 
limited number of years. In fact, however, entrepreneurial income continued to increase, 
doubling between 1988 and 2005 (in constant dollars). For purpose of comparison, mean 
personal income reported across all tax filing units increased by 9 percent over the same 
period.     52





























































































The continued growth of entrepreneurial income may reflect in part, the growing 
shift the economy’s compensation from labor to capital. Gordon and Dew-Becker (2006, 
Figure 2) capital’s share of National Income rose from .24 in 1980 to .31 in 2005. Labor’s 
share in 1980 was unusually high, even compared to adjacent years, but taking this into 
account still shows capital’s share of national income rising by about 5 percent, a number 
that could have helped fuel the continued growth of entrepreneurial income in the top 1 
percent even after adjustments were made to the TRA 1986.  Equally important, over half 
the growth of average top 1 percent income came from a steady increase in wage income, 
an increase that continued even after the top bracket rate increases of 1992 (Figure 7).   
In sum, there is little evidence to suggest that the growing concentration of income 
in the top 1 percent of tax filing units is an artifact of any kind. Tax rates clearly influence 
the year-to-year timing of increases but the underlying trends are the mirror image of an   53
average worker who is losing ground both to capital and to the best paid members of the 
economy.  
 